Comment on Meir Dan-Cohen, Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries of States

Goldberg praises Meir Dan-Cohen\u27s creative thinking about state wrongdoing but argues that it is ultimately unclear how a nation gets relieved of responsibility for its past harms. Equally unclear is why as a normative matter nations should be permitted to obtain temporal shifts. Dyadic conflicts that redefine the wrongdoer might be easier to envision because the victim is empowered to redraw the boundary of the wrongdoer. When a nation commits wrong, the justification for redrawing its boundaries often must come from somewhere other than a single victim\u27s forgiveness

The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability

Tort scholars have long been obsessed with the dichotomy between strict liability and liability based on fault or wrongdoing. We argue that this is a false dichotomy. Torts such as battery, libel, negligence, and nuisance are wrongs, yet all are “strictly” defined in the sense of setting objective and thus quite demanding standards of conduct. We explain this basic insight under the heading of “the strict liability in fault.” We then turn to the special case of liability for abnormally dangerous activities, which at times really does involve liability without wrongdoing. Through an examination of this odd corner of tort law, we isolate “the fault in strict liability”—that is, the fault line between the wrongs-based form of strict liability that is frequently an aspect of tort liability and the wrongs-free form of strict liability that is found only within the very narrow domain of liability for abnormally dangerous activities. We conclude by defending these two features of the common law of tort: the strictness of the terms on which it defines wrongdoing and its begrudging willingness to recognize, in one special kind of case, liability without wrongdoing

The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort

Fraud on the market is at the core of contemporary securities law, permitting 10b-5 class actions to proceed without direct proof of investor reliance on a misrepresentation. Yet the ambiguities of this idea have fractured the Supreme Court from its initial recognition of the doctrine in Basic v. Levinson to its recent decision in Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds. Amidst divergent views of the coherence and advisability of liability for fraud on the market a fundamental question lurks: is a suit for damages that invokes the fraud-on-the-market theory a claim for common law deceit, such that liability is properly limited by requirements such as scienter and loss causation, or is it an indirect regulatory enforcement action that should be unconstrained by these requirements so that liability can better serve its deterrent and compensatory purposes? Rejecting both of these options, we argue for a third way. Fraud-on-the-market claims are not private attorney general actions; they are genuine tort claims through which victims seek redress for having been wronged. Yet the wrong differs fundamentally in substance from the wrong of deceit. Building on a careful analysis of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, Basic v. Levinson, and common law, we articulate the unique character of the fraud-on-the-market tort. Rooted not in deceit but instead in the Congressionally recognized right of investors to trust in the integrity of securities markets, it does not protect investors from being deceived, but rather protects them against economic loss caused by intentional distortions of market prices. This simultaneously explains why fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs are properly freed from having to prove reliance and why the Supreme Court was perhaps justified in imposing restrictions on liability that are foreign to the common law

Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette

As part of a symposium issue of the Indiana Law Journal devoted to our Civil Recourse Theory of Tort Law, we respond to criticisms by Judge Calabresi, Judge Posner, and Professors Chamallas, Robinette, and Rustad. Calabresi and Posner criticize Civil Recourse Theory as a bit of glib moralism that fails to generate useful answers to the difficult questions that courts face when applying Tort Law. We show with several examples, both old and new, that the glibness is all on their side. From duty to causation to punitive damages, from products liability to fraud to privacy, our scholarship has had a great deal to say on pressing questions in tort. Posner and Calabresi seem to assume that, because our work engages rather than deconstructs concepts such as \u27duty\u27, it cannot address the ‘practical’ issues raised by tort cases. They have things exactly backwards. Civil Recourse Theory engages Tort Law’s concepts precisely in order to address those issues; that is, to a great extent, the point of the enterprise. In a similar vein, Professors Chamallas, Rustad, and Robinette allege that Civil Recourse Theory is blind to various ‘realities\u27; including that Tort Law’s value resides in part in its furtherance of certain policies, that it sometimes operates as an agent of injustice, and that it departs in practice from theory. Of course we have never denied any of these obvious truths. Rather, we have argued that, if Tort Law’s instrumental value is to be appreciated and enhanced, its content as a body of common law cannot be treated in a facile manner. If its discriminatory impact is to be grasped and eliminated, the particular way in which it empowers injury victims must be made clear. If the behavior of legal actors in the shadow of the law is be understood and evaluated, the structure and content of Tort Law’s rules must be rendered more transparent

The Myths of Macpherson

For a symposium marking the centenary of MacPherson v. Buick, we identify three common characterizations of Cardozo’s famous opinion that purport to explain its importance. Unfortunately, each of these characterizations turns out to be a myth. MacPherson is worthy of celebration, but not because it recognizes that negligence law’s duty of care is owed to the world, nor because it displays the promise of an instrumental, policy-oriented approach to adjudication, nor because it embraces a nascent form of strict products liability. These myths of MacPherson reflect deep misunderstandings of tort law, and of Cardozo’s distinctively pragmatic approach to adjudication. Ironically, although they have been largely fostered by progressives, the myths lend support to the cause of modern tort reform. By contrast, an accurate appreciation of MacPherson’s virtues permits an understanding of negligence, tort law, and common law adjudication that provides grounds for resisting regressive reforms

The Easy Case for Products Liability: A Response to Polinsky & Shavell

In their article “The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,” Professors Polinsky and Shavell assert the extraordinary claim that there should be no tort liability - none at all - for injuries caused by widely-sold products. In particular, they claim to have found convincing evidence that the threat of tort liability creates no additional incentives to safety beyond those already provided by regulatory agencies and market forces, and that tort compensation adds little or no benefit to injury victims beyond the compensation already provided by various forms of insurance. In this response, we explain that, even on its own narrow terms, “Uneasy,” comes nowhere near to demonstrating what it purports to demonstrate. We also identify various “benefits” provided by tort liability for product-related injuries that Polinsky and Shavell entirely fail to consider. In fact, the case for some form of products liability - whether fault-based or defect-based - is really quite easy

Scaling and modeling of three-dimensional, end-wall, turbulent boundary layers

The method of matched asymptotic expansion was employed to identify the various subregions in three dimensional, turbomachinery end wall turbulent boundary layers, and to determine the proper scaling of these regions. The two parts of the b.l. investigated are the 3D pressure driven part over the endwall, and the 3D part located at the blade/end wall juncture. Models are proposed for the 3d law of the wall and law of the wake. These models and the data of van den Berg and Elsenaar and of Mueller are compared and show good agreement between models and experiments

Flow rate of polygonal grains through a bottleneck: Interplay between shape and size

We report two-dimensional simulations of circular and polygonal grains passing through an aperture at the bottom of a silo. The mass flow rate for regular polygons is lower than for disks as observed by other authors. We show that both the exit velocity of the grains and the packing fraction are lower for polygons, which leads to the reduced flow rate. We point out the importance of the criteria used to define when two objects of different shape are considered to be of the same size. Depending on this criteria, the mass flow rate may vary significantly for some polygons. Moreover, the particle flow rate is non-trivially related to a combination of mass flow rate, particle shape and particle size. For some polygons, the particle flow rate may be lower or higher than that of the corresponding disks depending on the size comparison criteria.Comment: 9 pages, 8 figure